

Date: 06/25/98

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

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(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 54214 Date:

10-10-2017

AGENCY : NSC

RECORD NUMBER : 145-10001-10187

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 180

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :

FROM: BRIG. GEN. LANSDALE

TO: THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE : 08/31/62

PAGES: 21

SUBJECTS: OPERATION MONGOOSE, PHASE II

PROJECTION OF ACTIONS, PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION:

RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C


CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/23/98

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF





31 August 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From:

Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject:

Phase II, Operation Mongoose

Pursuant to your instructions, transmitted herewith is a proposed projection of actions to be undertaken as Phase II, Operation Mongoose. This projection incorporates the suggestions of the operations team designated by the major departments and agencies charged with Mongoose planning and implementation.

The format employed is responsive to the 16 August 1962 guidelines for Phase II, Operation Mongoose, and to your comments at recent meetings. The projection is divided into each objective contained in the 16 August guidelines, and then lists proposed actions to attain that objective. The guideline objectives have been given short titles as follows:

- A. Discredit and isolate the regime
- B. Harass the economy
- C. Intensify intelligence collection
- D. Split regime leadership and relations with Bloc
- E. Assist Cuban exile groups and Latin American governments to take actions
- F. Be prepared to exploit a revolt

In preparing this projection of actions for Phase II, Operation Mongoose, an effort was made to restrict proposals to the "B plus" frame of reference provided and to assume that a broader frame of programming under the NSAM would supplement Mongoose by separate planning.

"Special Handling" number copies to:

Special Group (Series A)

- 1. General Taylor
- 2. Mr. Johnson
- 3. Mr. Gilpatric
- Added (Series B)
- 1. Mr. Bundy,
- 2. Mr. Rusk

- 4. Mr. McCone
- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lemnitzer
- 3. Mr. McNamara
- 4. Mr. Murrow

Operational Representatives (Series B)

- 5. Mr. Hurwitch (State)
- 6. General Johnson (Defense)
- 7. Mr. Harvey (CIA)

8. Mr. Wilson (USIA)

9-15. Chief of Operations

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PHASE II

(1 August 1962 until

OBJECTIVE A: DISCREDIT AND ISOLATE THE REGIME

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

Political

- sultative Committee (SCCS), to establish Encourage Latin American nations, bilaterally and through the OAS Special Con controls over the travel of their nationals to Cuba. - (State, with CIA support)
- Encourage Latin American nations, bilaterally and through the SCCS, to limit or prohibit entry of Cuban propaganda. (State, with CIA and USIA support)
- Provide intelligence of arms smuggling (CIA, State, Defense) from Cuba to other Hemisphere nations
- As opportune, initiate action or support another nation's initiative in the OAS with gime in Cuba. (State, with CIA support) respect to countering the Communist re-

facilitate the collection of intelligence on persons travelling. American nationals to Cuba and to To diminish travel by Latin

propaganda into Latin America. To diminish the influx of Cuban

of Cuban subversion in the Hemis-To obtain and exploit hard evidence phere

pheric context of the Cuban problem. To maintain the multilateral hemis-

CONSIDERATIONS

tutional provisions regarding freedom of

Most Latin American nations have consti

bars against admitting foreign publications. Many Latin American countries have legal

Commanders requested to develop and encourage Latins to develop alerting systems, to include anti-infiltration training

the Cuban issue may be surfaced. As an supported and exploited. example of this activity, the current Deep division within the Hemisphere over Dominican initiative in the OAS should be

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COPY | of 6 COPIES SERIES A

PURPOSE

- Continue the program of excluding Cuba from Hemisphere organizations (State, with CIA support)
- Stimulate manifestations critical of the groups. (State, with CIA and USIA and student and other significant impact American political, labor, religious, Castro/Communist regime by Latin
- Cuban diplomats, officials, and delegates Encourage and exploit the defection of abroad. (CIA)
- of the nature of the Castro/Communist Keep friendly nations fully informed regime and of U.S. policy with respect to it. (State, with CIA and USIA support)

action

To provide for coordinated

Cuba. To strengthen the isolation of


imitated. has rejected Cuba as a model to be To demonstrate that Latin America


revelations by Cuban "insiders." To make utmost political use of

> Possible exceptions, such as in public CONSIDERATIONS

health, should be examined to determine as they happen. "Events" could include should stem naturally out of Cuban events, U.S. national interest on what is happening to students, workers, To be productive, such demonstrations etc. inside Cuba. Cuban refugee publication of substantive facts

exploiting the defection fully for propaganda if they cannot be recruited in place, then be more valuable, it is not always so, and Although keeping defectors "in place" can is important. Note items 45 and 46





CONSIDERATIONS

Psychological

9 Beamed to Cuba, initiate a planned series of statements by U.S. and other free world official and non-official spokesmen which support developing and maintaining the will to resist within Cuba. (USIA, with State and CIA support).

10 Continue Voice of America short-wave broadcasts to Cuba. (USIA)

To maintain resistance morale within Cuba.

To maintain regular, overt communication with the Cuban people.

o maintain regular, overt

Moderation must be the keynote. Some unfavorable comment from Cuban refuges groups should be expected, demanding a harder line.

The activity is based on nine hours of daily broadcasting in Spanish, with three hours daily specifically programmed for Cuba Carefully documented programs of the failures of the Castro/Communist system will be increased, to maintain a subjective basis for Cuban disaffection. Emphasis will be given to repudiations of the Castro/Communist regime elsewhere, particularly the Western Hemisphere.

This activity now includes both VOA short—wave broadcasts. Renewed efforts will be made to enlist support from Inter-American Broadcasters Association members and other groups. "Soap operas" and special commentaries on anti-Castro themes will be included.

Western Hemisphere. (USIA)

To keep the people of the Hemisphere awake to the Cuban situation



SPECIAL HANDENS SECRET-NOFORM

PURPOSE

ACTIVITY

Produce propaganda cartoon books. (USIA)

Latin America. youth, labor, and other groups in image of Castro/Communism among To build and reinforce a negative

Produce photo-novels carrying the propaganda story. (USIA)

Same as 12 above.

Supply TV outlets in Latin America with materials. (USIA).

> Same as 12 above, plus impact on key leader audiences

Produce short films for commercial outlets and impact groups in Latin America. (USIA).

Same as 12 above.

Produce propaganda exhibits ("before" and "after") for public and organizational display. (USIA).

Same as 12 above.



CONSIDERATIONS


will determine if additional funds will have to be sought. reform problems, prisoner treatment, Congressional action on USIA's FY 63 budget Soviet technicians, guerrillas, etc). Final Themes can be updated quickly (agrarian

ment. These novels would complement the An anti-Castro pilot model is under develop cartoon books (in 12 above), particularly in urban working groups


covers all major cities in Latin America In addition to supplying documentaries and except Santiago and Valparaiso, Chile, and shorts will be tried. Commercial TV now news clips, a series of one-minute puppet La Paz, Bolivia

Government censorship of all films in Latin America presents a potential problem.

with his actions. An electric motor turns the slats on a venetian blind exhibit, changing the picture. The first one contrasts Castro's promises Three such exhibits are now being developed



- 18. Special propaganda exploitation of U.S. information about the agricultural labor, and public health situation in Cuba. (State, with CIA and USIA support).
- 9. Expand the delivery of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails legal travellers, and controlled couriers. (CIA).
- 20. Develop specific proposal for use of balloons to deliver propaganda. (CIA)
- 21. Direct propaganda at Soviet and other Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA)



Same as 12 above, plus impact on intellectuals and other opinion leaders.

To make full use of the factual basis for propaganda actions exposing true conditions inside Cuba.

To disaffect the Cuban people and to help maintain the will to resist.

To provide a means of distributing propaganda inside Cuba.

To make them disaffected with their role in Cuba.

TOP SEGRET NOFORN

CONSIDERATIONS

Volume will depend in part on results of USIA's request for supplemental funds for the Latin American book program, now pending before Congress. Several new books are now in the pipeline.

Current research on Cuba by US departments and agencies, outside Mongoose, should be maintained and then be passed into Mongoose channels for use in the project. This includes Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor, and the Public Health Service.

The "Gusano Libre" theme deserves much wider exploitation, since this is a theme created by resistance within Cuba itself.

This distribution technique must appear as a genuine Cuban refugee project. It must consider risks of injuring population or being exploited along that line by the Castro/Communist regime to the detriment of Mongoose objectives.



CONSIDERATIONS

22. "Voice of Free Cuba" broadcasts from submarine. (CIA, with Defense support).

> inside Cuba. To have a "voice" for resistance

can be made into an effective medium, at activity closely with State and USIA. refugee community. CIA will coordinate this full use should be made of talents in the Cuban small risk. In strengthening the effectiveness, The initial broadcasts indicated that this

23. Continue "Radio Americas" broadcasts from Swan Island as appropriate.

Communist regime.

To provide an irritant to the Castro/


24. Make available to the International tation of narcotics. (State). evidence of Cuban exportation/impor-Narcotics Commission documented


> versive activities. in Latin America of Cuban sub-To create increased awareness

hemisphere and world opinion. should be fully exploited for impact upon Documented evidence available or obtainable

Communist regime. Latin America of the Castro/ To sow and increase distrust in

in the specific country. spot basis, coordinated with U.S. objectives This activity will be undertaken only on a






OBJECTIVE B: HARASS THE ECONOMY

ACTIVITY

26. Encourage the Cuban people, as appro priate, to engage in minor acts of sabotage. (CIA).

cations, power, and transport raw materials; to encourage the limited way. spirit of resistance, even in a facilities; to reduce availability of

To cause breakdowns of communi




CONSIDERATIONS

actions as excessive use of electricity or material spoilage, and crop burning. puncturing tires, contaminating gas tanks), immobilizing vehicles (stealing parts, short-circuiting of telephone equipment, 'Minor acts of sabotage" include such

used, it is probable that this activity will method of mass distribution of leaflets is to the Cuban people; however, unless a attributable, will be used to get the message All forms of media, non-US government be minor and spotty.

can be developed with the necessary access of the operation, or by internal assets if such operation and extiltrated at the completion sabotage teams infiltrated especially for the will be conducted either by especially to the target. The following are currently trained, carefully selected commando/ Depending upon circumstances, the sabotage selected targets:



27.


Conduct selected major sabotage

supplies and services

To reduce available economic



27. (continued)



CONSIDERATIONS

Matahambre Mine-Santa Lucia

Texaco Refinery-Santiago

Shell/Esso Refinery-Habana

Regla Steam Electric Plant-Habana

Matanzas Steam Electric Plant-Matanzas

Nicaro Nickel Plant

Moa Bay Nickel Plant

11

Paper Mill - Cardenas


Micro Wave Towers

Each operation entails risk, not only physical risk for the saboteurs, but also risk of attribution to the U.S. in case of capture. Care will be taken to give these actions the appearance of being done by internal resistance groups, and in isolating team members from press sources upon return. The U.S. handling of information, in case of contingency, will be established by CIA in coordination with USIA and State.

1.3 at



Sabotage Cuban assets outside Cuba as targets of opportunity, provided medical supplies, or the Cuban people as such. (CIA) this does not unduly affect food and



- Cuba (CIA and State) Inspire labor groups outside Cuba to obstruct free world trade with
- Discourage free world trade with Cuba. (State, supported by CIA).
- Encourage the OAS Special Committee against Cuba by Latin American to recommend further trade measures countries. (State)



place strain upon regime security To cripple Cuban commerce and

resources, including shipping. To force the use of more Bloc

free world equipped industrial deterioration of Cuba's essentially currency earnings, and to hasten resources, to deny Cuba hard To force the use of more Bloc

mend trade controls to NATO pressures upon NATO to recom members. To provide a basis for renewed



CONSIDERATIONS

activity requires a capability to act quickly shipment to the USSR. dity, fire or water damage, etc. A recent Sabotage would be to cause undue delay of as shipments of products into or from Cuba on spot intelligence. Targets are seen mostl example was reported, post-action, on a shipment, using additives to spoil a commo Things, not people, are the targets. This


This is an activity mostly in third countries

hard consideration other forms of economic warfare deserve of Japan recently. Preclusive buying and as a source of supply, such as the example porters might be dissuaded from using Cuba to imposing necessary trade controls. Im-Most free world trading nations are opposed

a good basis for Special Committee action geared to SCCS reports or other developments in the Hemisphere which might provide OAS Special Committee action should be



32. Reduce production of export agricovert means. (CIA). cultural commodities in Cuba, by



CONSIDERATIONS

The main export commodities are sugar,

program. to the regime's domestic economic To cripple Cuban commerce vital

would include tobacco, tropicals, and coffee. machinery, etc. shipping containers, sabotage of sugar mill destruction of bags, cartons, and other pering of harvests by work slow-downs. Activities

are recognized. However, a priority alert The operational difficulties in this activity for this is warranted.

and defense capability.

To sabotage Cuba's transportation

1.360/4

blished Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban Government Posts abroad. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).

PURPOSE

The purpose of all activities under this objective is to provide maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:

- a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro Government.
- b. Soviet activities in Cuba including details of Soviet military personnel, units, locations, capabilities, et al
- c. Activities of Cuban G-2
- d. Military and militia order of battle and morale.
- e. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.
- Focus of power and/or stress and strain among the "Power Centers" in the Cuban Govern ment.
- g. Evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.

SPECIAL HAT DETHE

CONSIDERATIONS

When possible they will be recruited and trained while visiting outside Cuba; however, when necessary recruitment and training will be done inside Cuba either by established agents or by agents infiltrated especially for the task. Whether this is done unilaterally or jointly with a third country intelligence organization is determined on a case by case basis.

In some cases the travel as generated specifically by CIA; in other cases the travels can be utilized to meet intelligence requirements.

34. (continued)

403d 1.3a4

In addition to meeting the above cited intelligence objectives, operational intelligence, and recruitment leads as well as agent material result from the Opa-locka and Madrid operations. In addition to meeting basic intelligence requirements above, timely operational intelligence is vital to CIA current operations.

35. Spot, recruit, and train third country nationals resident in Cuba. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).


See 34 above.

36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers who have potential access to significant information. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).

See 34 above.

37. Continue Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense, USIA, and other support).

See 34 above.



The continuation of the refugee flow and the selective debriefing of refugees provide the most significant source of intelligence. Follow up debriefing of selected refugees after departure from Opa-locak will continue.


38.

See 34 above.

39. Maintain PAA service between the U.S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support).



41. Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA).




skilled manpower from Cuba. to continue the exodus of ntellingence and agen


See 34 above.

ganda material. To obtain intelligence and propa-


See 34 above.




CONSIDERATIONS



tinue this activity. PAA requires financial assistance to con-



This is done on a regular basis by FBIS.



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
44. Establish program of periodic reports from U.S. Embassies in Hemisphere analyzing the effects of existence of the target area regime on host country. (State).

SPECIAL HANDLING
PURPOSE


See 34 above.

To maintain a reasonably current estimate of the impact of the target area regime on the Hemisphere.

CONSIDERATIONS



16/16



Collect personality information on key their attitudes, their associates, and their influences. (CIA and others). Cuban individuals, their personalities

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

between the individuals. individuals and to identify frictions To identify channels to key

the channel is effectively established or in the regime will be determined in the exploitation of the channel or of any splits the split is detected work plus the "breaks of the game." The light of existing circumstances at the time developed depends on basic professional The degree to which these channels can be This is a long term continuing program

to selected key individual and "power Develop channels of communication centers" of the regime. (CIA)

individuals.

To permit exploitation of the key


To attain the objective.

Conduct psychological and political

action. (CIA and State).

Activity will include:


By public and private comment, to principally among the militia, the labor, youth and students, farmers government bureaucracy, by organized in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, stimulate distrust and disaffection




47. (continued)

1.3 at

CONSIDERATIONS



tensions. and Bloc personnel to exacerbate Provoke incidents between Cubans



the propaganda and political activities of all Cuban exile groups and individuals offering useful impact inside Cuba and upon world opinion. (CIA, with State and USIA support).

PURPOSE

To encourage and maintain the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communist rule. To provide an articulate, meaningful symbol and voice of free Cuba to informand influence public and official opinion outside Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

and lead in this effort, with U.S. assisting of propaganda that reports on the true state Communist dictatorship. Cubans speaking of Cuba's enslavement and misery under countries and Spain as well as those in the possible. Groups such as a "Free Cuban for Cuba are the most credible witnesses effective in production and dissemination Major popular impact groups can be most and advising. exiles should consider exiles in hemisphere of Cuba." This program of support for those committing "crimes against the people openly prepare for eventual punishment of USA. As possible, the exiles should manage Judicial Committee" could publicize and

Provide covert support to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC). (CIA).

To provide a degree of cohesion within the exile community and to provide a cover and funding mechanism for the invasion survivors and prisoners. In addition some funding of constituent exile groups is handled thru CRC. To support and guide CRC propaganda activities directed at Latin America and Cuba itself.


In spite of its many inadequacies, the CRC performs a variety of useful functions which if it were to be disbanded, would have to be handled by possibly less efficient means.



50. Encourage and support other governprograms for Cuba along lines of our own effort. (State, CIA). ments in the hemisphere to undertake

timing, upon a separate-butgram with common goals and countries instead of placing focus attention and effort toward collective basis. To direct mainly on the U.S. initiative of Latin American To develop a multi-national pro-

> and coordination is involved, with recognition third nation efforts. that the U.S. is helping not employing the but not prohibitive criteria for consultation initiative in other national leaders. Reasonable and covert U.S. actions, to stir and support This will require the highest order of overt



Continue to develop and refine contingency plans. (Defense)

52

Continue planning with Defense and the

various sub-commanders for the parti-

cipation of others in military contingency

the standpoint of military planning To assure maximum readiness from

These plans are well advanced

CONSIDERATIONS

PURPOSE

for military intervention if directed

tingency plans. the event of execution of military con To provide support to the military in

53. Establish and maintain in being the plans for Cuba. (State, CIA and USIA). necessary communication and crypto cluding various sub-commands. (CIA) links between CIA and Defense, in-

> tingency plans. bility to support the military con-To provide the communication capa

> > process of being established. These links have been or are in the

Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, of others). and political groups. (State, with support

Castro resistance elements and to Communism. successful overthrow of Castro, Castro government in the event of a facilitate the transition of a post To provide a focal point for anti-

> substantial change due to circumstances tinuing study and which may be subject to which exist at the time This is a matter which will require con-



PURPOSE

To have available in Cuba a re-

5 Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in areas of Cuba accessible to known resistance elements and in potential resistance areas. (CIA).


6 Recruit, train, and supply small resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba.

(CIA).

event of an uprising.

To provide controlled intelligence sources and to be available in the

serve of arms and ammunition.



CONSIDERATIONS

This will require extensive maritime infiltration/exfiltration operations. It is considered likely that Cuban maritime patrolling will be such that in the near future if the job is to be done, summarines must be used in lieu of surface craft.

security controls have demonstrated the or if its continued presence jeopardises the will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered completion of training, the infiltrated team filtrees can become "legalized." Therefore any method yet been devised by which in: country for an indefinite period. and/or exfiltration in lieu of surface marimarines or aircraft as a means of infiltration capabilities may require the utilization of sub support infiltrees. Increased Cuban defensive the willingness of the Cuban population to morale and motivation of agent material and stances; including Cuban security controls and possible in the light of existing circum developed to the extent that proves feasible "legal" residents. The program will be intelligence and/or resistance cells. recruit and train small "legal" compartmented two to five man teams will be infiltrated to individuals or "Black Teams" in the large difficulty of infiltrating and monitoring Experience and continually tightening time facilities. Upon